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Audit committee financial expertise, gender, and earnings 
management: Does gender of the financial expert matter? 
   
ABSTRACT  
The effectiveness of the presence of financial expertise on the audit committee (AC) in reducing 
earnings management has been the subject of many previous studies with mixed findings. This paper 
suggests that the mixed findings may be due to prior studies not distinguishing between the genders of 
the financial experts on the AC. We investigate how financial expertise affects earnings management 
taking into account the gender of the financial expert. We use the data of a sample of 5,660 US firm-
year observations from 2007 to 2013 which was analysed using least squares regressions clustering by 
firm. The results indicate that proportion of financial expertise on the AC and gender reduce earnings 
management. We then group the AC financial experts by gender, and examine whether the gender of 
the financial expert matters. The results show that the proportion of female financial experts on the 
AC is significantly associated with less earnings management while the proportion of male financial 
experts does not significantly affect earnings management; this suggests that previous studies 
indicating that the presence of a financial expert on the AC may have been influenced by gender of 
the female financial experts. Further, our findings may also partly explain why studies on the effect 
that financial expertise has on the AC are conflicting.  
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Audit committee (AC) plays a key role in overseeing, monitoring and advising the 
management of an organization in implementing internal accounting control systems and the 
preparation of financial statements (Arun, Almahrog, & Aribi, 2015; Bédard  & Gendron, 
2010; Sun, Liu, & Lan, 2011).  According to Klein (2002), in their role as overseers of the 
firm’s financial reporting process, members of the AC meet regularly with the firm’s 
managers and auditors to review the corporation’s financial statements, audit process, and 
internal accounting controls.  To improve the effectiveness of the AC following accounting 
scandals, such as the Enron Scandal in the US, there are now requirements in many countries 
for some members of the AC to have financial expertise (Badolato, Donelson, & Ege, 2014; 
Bédard & Gendron, 2010; Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999; General Accounting Office, 1991; 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; Smith Committee, 2003).  
The requirements for an AC to have a financial expert among its members has 
attracted considerable research as to whether such financial expertise makes a difference (e.g., 
Badolato et al., 2014; Bédard & Gendron, 2010; Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein, & Neal, 
2006; Dhaliwal, Naiker, & Navissi, 2010; Ismail & Abdullah, 2013). For example, Badolato 
et al. (2014) found that ACs with both financial expertise and high relative status are 
associated with lower earnings management. Qi & Tian (2012) also found that the presence 
of a financial expert on the AC reduces earnings management while Davidson, Xie, & Xu 
(2004) reported significant positive stock price reaction when new members of the AC have 
financial expertise. Although Albring, Robinson, & Robinson (2014) found that accounting 
expertise contributes to the AC’s monitoring of auditor independence, they report that 
broader financial expertise is not an effective mechanism.  A review article on the evidence 
of the effectiveness of financial expertise on aspects of financial reporting by Bédard & 
Gendron (2010) report that 57% of the studies identified found a positive association between 
3 
 
financial expertise and effectiveness, while 10% found a negative association and the 
remaining 33% indicated a non-significant association. Thus, on the evidence provided by 
Bédard & Gendron (2010), the effectiveness of financial expertise in curtailing financial 
reporting abuses is mixed. 
There are a number of possible reasons for the conflicting results on the effectiveness 
of the AC ranging from sample size, statistical method used, time period, and country of 
study. In this study we suggest that the conflicting results may have been due to prior studies 
not distinguishing between the genders of the financial experts on the AC. This is because 
most existing studies investigating the monitoring role of financial expertise operationalize 
financial expertise as ‘the presence’ of a financial expert on the audit committee (e.g., Bédard, 
Chtourou, & Courteau, 2004; Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein & Neal, 2006; Dhaliwal, Naiker, 
& Navissi, 2006; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008; Liu, Tiras, & Zhuang, 
2014; Yang & Krishnan, 2005) or the ‘proportion of financial experts’ on the AC (e.g., 
Albring et al., 2014; Badolato et al., 2014) without distinguishing whether the financial 
expert is ‘female’ or ‘male’. It is, therefore, possible that the results which found that 
financial expertise constrains earnings management may be influenced by the ‘gender’ rather 
than ‘financial expertise’ of the AC member.  If this suggestion is plausible, we would expect 
AC female experts to have a more pronounced effect on earnings management than their 
male counterparts would. Such a finding may also explain the contradictory results on the 
effectiveness of financial expertise. This is because the genders of the AC ‘financial expert’ 
used by extant research are likely to differ from one study to the other. 
The objective of our study is to investigate the effect of the AC financial expertise and 
gender on earnings management. In particular, we seek to determine if gender of the financial 
expert matters in constraining earnings management. We first investigate the impact of AC 
financial expertise and gender as per existing literature. We then split financial experts from 
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our sample of 5,660 US firm years from 2007 to 2013 by gender into female financial experts 
and male financial experts and investigate how they affect earnings management. The 
findings suggest that financial expertise and gender are associated with less earnings 
management. When the financial experts are split by gender, the results show that the 
proportion of female financial experts on the AC is significantly associated with less earnings 
management. However, the proportion of male financial experts does not significantly affect 
earnings management.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature in two main ways. First, our evidence 
suggests that existing research findings on the effectiveness of AC financial expertise in 
reducing earnings management (e.g., Badolato et al., 2014; Qi & Tian, 2014) may have been 
driven by female financial expertise.  Second, the results of our study also contribute to 
existing literature by offering a plausible reason for the contradictory findings on the 
effectiveness of financial expertise as a monitoring mechanism (e.g., Badolato et al., 2014; 
Bédard & Gendron, 2010).  We suggest that a possible reason for the contradictory results on 
the effectiveness of AC financial expertise is due to the differences in the gender of the 
financial expert across the different studies. Further, our study also contributes to the limited 
and contradictory evidence for the efficacy of gender on constraining earnings management 
(e.g., Ismail & Abdullah, 2013; Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011; Qi & Tian, 2012).  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
develops hypotheses on financial expertise, gender, and financial expertise by gender. Section 
3 discusses the research method and data. While Section 4 discusses and presents the 
empirical findings, Section 5 reports our robustness checks. Finally Section 6 summarizes the 





2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
Bédard & Gendron (2010) found that most research on ACs was guided by legal and 
economic theories.  According to legal theories, ACs should be effective because they need to 
fulfil their responsibilities required by law. Although the legal theories apply to our study, it 
is mostly guided by agency theory – the most prominent economics-based theory used to 
explain ACs effectiveness. The theory – mostly attributed to Jensen & Meckling’s (1976) 
paper – suggests that agency costs arise because of the separation of ownership from control 
since managers as agents will not always act in the best interests of the principal 
(shareholders).  To reduce the agency costs, the principal (shareholders) will incur monitoring 
costs. According to agency theory, monitoring expenditure allows the principal to better 
observe the agent’s actions, thereby preventing the agent from taking the actions that the 
reduce firm’s value (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989).  These 
monitoring expenditures include costs of hiring board members who will then form 
subcommittees such as the AC. To be effective, the members of the AC are expected to have 
certain qualities such as financial expertise and diversity in terms of gender, which are the 
focus of this study.  
A number of views are expressed in literature to explain why AC finance expertise 
and gender may improve monitoring effectiveness. For example, Harris & Raviv (2008) 
suggest that financial experts have lower costs of acquiring information about the complexity 
and associated risks of certain financial transactions and hence are able to efficiently monitor 
senior management. Gore, Matsunanga & Yeung (2011, p. 772) also suggest that ‘while 
incentive to monitor is important, effective monitoring requires a high degree of specialised 
knowledge in order to evaluate managerial decisions.  Without adequate financial training 
and experience, even motivated directors cannot determine whether the firm’s financial 
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policies are appropriate’. Krishnan & Visvanathan (2008) add that AC members with finance 
expertise enhance accounting conservatism by their better monitoring capability-driven 
knowledge base, job expectation as demanded by audit committee charter, and economic 
incentives to mitigate the risk of litigation and protect reputational capital. 
Regarding presence of women on the board, Adams & Ferreira  (2009) suggest that 
their presence is likely to contribute to improved monitoring because they are not part of the 
‘old-boys’ club’, which puts them closer to independent directors. Moreover, by examining 
the monitoring intensity of women with respect to retention decisions and compensation 
contracts, Adams & Ferreira (2009) evince that women are stricter monitors than their male 
counterparts. Also, scholars have suggested that gender diversity facilitates effective 
monitoring by broadening expertise, experience, interests, perspectives and creativity 
(Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; van Knippenberg, van Ginkel, & Barkema, 2012). 
Moreover, according to Chattopadhyay, Goerge, & Shulman (2008), gender diversity may 
give rise to conflict due to lack of trust, and this is likely to increase scrutiny.  
 
2.2 Prior studies and hypotheses development 
2.2.1 Financial expertise 
The financial background of board members represents one of the most widely 
investigated attribute that is of interest to regulators. For example, Beekes, Pope, & Young 
(2004) postulate that, to be efficient as a monitoring mechanism, directors should have 
enough monitoring incentives and understand the consequences of financial reporting 
decisions. Arguably, directors should be able to understand the consequences of financial 
reporting decisions if they have the required financial background.  This helps them to 
understand the complexity of financial reporting, to identify and to ask questions which make 
managers think harder, to understand auditors’ judgement, and to support the auditor in 
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auditor-management disputes (DeZoort & Salterio, 2001; Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993; Levitt, 
2000; Mangena & Pike, 2005; Zhang, Zhou, & Zhou, 2007).  
Since the AC is responsible for the financial reporting process, board members who 
sit on the AC should have the skills, financial expertise and training required to fulfil their 
duties and investigate the reasonableness of CEO explanations. The importance of financial 
expertise is emphasised by SOX (2002) which states that directors should have the required 
experience in preparing and auditing financial statements and accounting for accruals, 
estimates, and reserves (Dhaliwal et al., 2010).  Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal (2009) 
note that one of the most crucial requirements for serving on the AC is that the directors 
possess financial expertise. Extant literature suggests that the financial experience of AC 
members plays a crucial role in constraining aggressive accounting practices. For example, 
Abbott, Parker, & Peters (2004) and Agrawal & Chadha (2005) find a negative relationship 
between the probability of restatement and the presence of at least one member with financial 
experience. Similarly, Bédard et al. (2004) and Hossain, Mitra, Rezaee & Sarath (2011) show 
that lower accruals-based earnings management is a characteristic of firms with at least one 
financial expert on the AC. Finally, Xie, Davidson & DaDalt (2003) find that discretionary 
current accruals are negatively related to the proportion of outside directors with corporate or 
investment (and investment banker) background. These findings all suggest that the effect of 
the audit committee depends partially on its members’ collective experience (Carcello et al., 
2006). Consistent with prior studies, we hypothesize a relationship between financial 
expertise and earnings management as follows:  
 





The appointment of female directors is likely to enhance board independence and 
improve the shareholders’ wealth. For example, it facilitates more informed decisions, 
enhances the decision-making process, and improves communication among board members 
(Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Daily & Dalton, 2003). In addition, the appointment of female 
directors enhances the depth and breadth of discussion and deliberations, particularly those 
related to challenging issues (Huse & Solberg, 2006; Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011; Stephenson, 
2004). Adams & Ferreira (2009) argue that because female directors do not belong to ‘old-
boy’ networks, they are more likely to provide greater oversight, monitoring, and 
independent thinking expected of independent directors. They exhibit better board attendance, 
undertake monitoring positions, and demand greater accountability from CEOs for bad 
performance (Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011). This close monitoring would reduce the 
information asymmetry at the board level and also encourage more public disclosure by 
curbing managers’ use of insider information for their own benefit (Gul et al., 2011; Srinidhi 
et al., 2011) which would subsequently constrain managers’ opportunism.   
Westphal & Zajac (1995) show that managers select directors who are 
demographically like them in order that they attain their support and collude to acquire higher 
compensation. Therefore, the appointment of female directors might ensure demographic 
diversity of the board, which might enhance the board’s monitoring function (Bear et al., 
2010). Also female directors are more conservative and risk-averse than their male 
counterparts (Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2016; Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Martin, Nishikawa, 
& Williams, 2009; Powell & Ansic, 1997), and are therefore less likely to allow managerial 
opportunism for fear of being caught. Female directors are more ethically sensitive than 
males (e,g., Ibrahim, Angelidis, & Tomic, 2009; Lund, 2008; Owhoso, 2002; Simga-Mugan, 
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Daly, Onkal, & Kavut, 2005) and are less tolerant towards managerial opportunism than male 
directors are.  
Extant research also supports that firms with female representatives outperform their 
rivals. For instance, Gul et al. (2011) find that female directors are associated with richer 
information environment, and Nekhili, Nagati, Chtioui & Nekhili (2017) show that corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) disclosure has more value-relevance for firms with gender-
diversified boards than for other firms. Similarly, Gul, Hutchinson & Lai (2013) showed that 
gender diversity adds to the transparency and accuracy of financial reports. They found that 
female directors are associated with more accurate and less dispersion of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Using a sample for the period from 2003 to 2005, Sun et al. (2011) show that 
gender does not affect audit committees’ effectiveness in constraining earnings management. 
However, their results should be interpreted with caution because the sample was limited to 
the period immediately after the passage of SOX when large US firms were under intense 
scrutiny over the role of audit committee in improving earnings management, which might 
have led to extra care being taken by both female and male directors. That is, during this 
period, there might be little evidence of the gender impact on directors’ behaviors. Using a 
large sample over a period from 2001 to 2007, Srinidhi et al. (2011) find that firms with 
female representatives on the audit committee exhibit higher earnings management, which 
suggests superior monitoring ability of female directors. Following these arguments, we state 
our second hypothesis as follows: 
H2 Gender has a significant impact on earnings management. 
  
 2.2.3 Financial expertise by gender 
The previous two hypotheses have discussed why financial expertise and gender may 
influence earnings management. In this section, we discuss why female financial experts are 
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expected to have more influence on earnings management than male financial experts. In 
addition, we argue why both female and male financial experts are expected to have an 
impact on earnings management.  
Bédard & Gendron (2010) call for studies to investigate how personal characteristics 
of board members, including financial expertise, influence their monitoring effectiveness. 
Dhaliwal et al. (2010) show that the monitoring capability of financial experts varies based 
on their independence, stock ownership, outside directorship, and tenure. Building on extant 
research, Srinidhi et al. (2011) demonstrate that female directors are more diligent, require 
better accountability for CEOs’ performance, and are more likely to challenge CEOs’ 
traditional practices and policies. Extending this argument, we suggest that, assuming the 
same level of financial expertise, AC female financial experts are more likely to have a more 
pronounced effect on earnings management than AC male financial experts.  
Although AC female financial experts are expected to have a more pronounced effect 
on earnings management than their male counterparts, we expect that the proportion of AC 
female financial experts and AC male financial experts will individually have a significant 
influence on earnings management given that previous studies (e.g., Abbott et al., 2004; 
Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Bédard  et al., 2004; Hossain et al., 2011) show that ACs with a 
financial expert (presumably either female or male) significantly influence earnings 
management. Our final hypotheses are, therefore, stated as follows: 
 
H3   The proportion of female financial experts on the AC has a more pronounced impact on       
earnings management than proportion of male financial experts. 




H3b   The proportion of male financial experts on the AC has a significant impact on earnings        
management.  
 
     3. Method and data 
3.1 Data 
Financial statement data are obtained for the years 2007 to 2013 from the 2013 annual 
Compustat File. To avoid the immediate impact of SOX on directors’ behavior towards 
earnings management, this study uses data collected from a more stable period following 
several years of the spate of US financial scandals and the introduction of SOX (i.e. from 
2007). Thus, directors’ concerns over accounting opportunisms might be lower during this 
period.  Our study excludes financial firms due to their different financial reporting 
environments. To ensure sufficient data to run model (1), we exclude industries with less than 
15 firm-year observations and exclude firms with missing data required for running model (1) 
(see Section 3.2). Financial data are then merged with female directors and board of 
directors’ data obtained from ISS (formerly RiskMetrics). Each firm-year observation should 
have the required data to calculate variables in model (2) (see Section 3.2) and, therefore, this 
study deletes any firm-year observations with missing governance or financial information 
required for the analysis.  The resulting sample is 5,660 firm-year observations with full data 
available over the period from 2007 to 2013.  
3.2 Estimating earnings management  
Extant research has used different methods to estimate earnings quality (i.e. less 
earnings management).  For instance, Dechow & Dichev (2002) define it as the extent to 
which current year accruals are associated with previous, current and subsequent year 
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operating cash flows, while Jones (1991) defines it as the extent to which accruals embedded 
in earnings are not opportunistically used by managers. However, McNichols (2002) 
develops a more rigorous estimation for earnings quality   by combining these two methods. 
Therefore, the current study uses a measure of earnings management based on Accruals 
Estimation Errors (AEE) measured using the expectation model proposed by McNichols 
(2002) as follows; 
 
WCA i,t /AT i,t-1 = β0 + β1 OCF i,t-1 /AT i,t-2 + β2 OCF i,t /AT i,t-1 + β3 OCF i,t+1 /AT i,t +    β4 
ΔSALESi,t /AT i,t-1 + β5 PPEi,t/AT i,t-1  + εit,                                                                                                              (1)                                                                                                                  
 
where WCA is working capital accruals measured as the (change in current assets - change in 
cash) – (change in current liabilities - change in the current portion of long-term debt)1.  OCF 
refers to cash flows from operations in year t, t-1, and t+1.  ΔSALES refers to the change in 
sales.   PPE is the gross property, plant, and equipment.  AEE for each firm is then estimated 
as the residuals from equation (1) run annually for each two-digit SIC industry with at least 
15 observations. Following Srinidhi et al. (2011), the current study focusses on the absolute 
value of residuals (ABS_AEE) where its high value indicates poor accruals quality. 
Then, we estimate model 2 to test our first and second hypotheses. Model 2 is 
developed so that it includes our primary variables of interest which are ABS_AEE, financial 
expertise (EXPERT), Audit committee female directors (ACFD). Beyond these variables, we 
reviewed other studies (e.g.., Arun et al., 2015; Peasnell, Pope, &Young, 2005; Zalata & Roberts, 
2016) on earnings management to determine other variables which have been found to influence 
earnings management that we needed to control for. 
 
                                                          
1
 Since managers have more discretion over working capital accrual, we focus our analysis on it.   
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ABS_AEE = β0 + β1 EXPERT + β2 ACFD + β3BSIZE + β4 ACSIZE +   β5 BIND + β6 OWN + 
β7 TEN + β8 OUT + β9 BIG4 + β10 SIZE + β11 LEV + β12 OCF + β13 ROA + β14LOSS + β15 
MBV + β16 NOA + β17 SALEG + β18REM,                                                                           (2)   
                                                                                                       
where ABS_AEE is the absolute value of accruals estimation errors (AEE). EXPERT refers 
to the proportion of financial expert directors serving on the audit committee.  Following 
Armstrong et al. (2015), we consider the director as a financial expert based on the definition 
provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) database
2
. ACFD is the proportion of 
female directors on the audit committee. Similar to prior studies and consistent with the first 
and second hypothesises (H1 and H2), we expect β1 and β2 to be negative. However, the 
effectiveness of directors might be subsumed by other observable governance quality 
(Srinidhi et al., 2011). Prior studies (Peasnell, Pope, &Young, 2005; Zalata & Roberts, 2016) 
show that earnings management is a common characteristic of companies with weak 
corporate governance. Therefore, the current study controls for other governance 
characteristics that might influence the ability of financial expertise in improving earnings 
management. These characteristics include: Board size (BSIZE) and audit committee size 
(AC_SIZE) measured as number of directors on the board audit committee, respectively. 
Large board and audit committee are more likely to include independent members with 
diversified experience that are more likely to challenge managers’ opportunistic practices and 
therefore improve earnings quality.  Independent directors (IND) measured as the percentage 
of independent directors to the total number of directors on the board. We expect IND to be 
more concerned about improving their reputation as experts in monitoring management, and 
                                                          
2
  Firms must disclose whomever is designated to be a financial expert and ISS identify who is the financial 
expert based on their bio. It seems that ISS follow the SOX and SEC definition. We therefore follow this 
definition for two reasons  
a) To be consistent with the regulatory language (Hayes, 2014).  
b) The findings of Dhaliwal et al. (2010) suggest that diverse skills are valuable and are more associated 
with high earnings quality.  
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therefore less likely to allow opportunistic decisions. We also include non-executive 
directors’ stock ownership (OWN) measured as the proportion of shares held by independent 
directors to the total outstanding shares. Arguably, OWN might align their interests with 
shareholders’ interests and therefore they are more likely to scrutinize managers’ decisions. 
On the other hand, OWN motivates them to collude with managers in order to achieve some 
personal benefits. Non-executive directors’ tenure (TEN) measured as the average number of 
years during which the independent directors were serving on the board is also included. We 
expect that long serving time on the board would improve directors’ knowledge of their 
firm’s operations and resources and therefore they are less likely to be dependent on 
managers on getting the required information. That is, we expect that directors with long 
tenure are more likely to be vigilant and exercise close scrutiny over managers’ actions.  
Non-executive directors’ outside directorships (OUT) measured as the average number of 
outside directorships held by independent directors was also included because directors with 
additional outside directorships are more likely to gain the required governance expertise and 
knowledge of best practice (Bédard  et al., 2004).  Finally, we control for Big 4 auditor (BIG4) 
measured as a dummy variable set to one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 auditors 
and zero otherwise. Extant research suggests that firms audited by big auditors have less 
accruals-based manipulation.   
Besides these governance characteristics, following Arun et al. (2015) and Ittonen, 
Vähämaa & Vähämaa (2013), we also add other variables to control for other factors that 
have been found to be useful predictors of firms’ discretionary accruals. These include firm 
size (SIZE) measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization value. Larger firms 
face high pressure to report more accurately, and prior studies (e.g., Dechow & Dichev, 2002) 
show that small companies are associated with reporting lower accruals quality. Arguably, 
troubled companies have higher motivation to engage in downward earnings management 
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(DeAngelo et al., 1994; Ittonen et al., 2013) and, therefore, LEV, OCF, ROA, and LOSS are 
used as proxies for firms’ financial condition; where LEV refers to Leverage measured as the 
long-term debt scaled by total equity,  OCF is operating cash flows measured as operations 
cash flows divided by lagged total assets, ROA is return on assets measured as net income 
scaled by lagged total assets, and LOSS is an indicator variable set to one if the net income is 
negative and zero otherwise.  Extant research suggests that growth firms are motivated to 
inflate their earnings to meet/beat analysts’ expectations (i.e. McVay, 2006) and, therefore, 
Market-to-Book value (MBV) is used as a proxy for growth. MBV is measured as the 
proportion of market value to book value of equity. Firms’ ability to engage in more accruals-
based earnings management is constrained by the extent to which they have already managed 
their earnings in the last year (Fan, Barua, Cready, & Thomas, 2010). Barton & Simko (2002) 
measure last year’s accruals-based earnings management using lagged net operating assets 
divided by sales (NOA). Therefore, we add control for NOA.  Net operating asset is the 
difference between operating assets and operating liabilities. Operating assets are calculated 
as total assets less cash and cash equivalents.  Operating liabilities are calculated as total 
assets less total debt, less book value of common and preferred equity, less non-controlling 
interests. 
Moreover, firms with high sales growth might be less transparent and thus more 
difficult audit, which might provide them with greater ability to manipulate; therefore, 
following Srinidhi et al. (2011), we control for sales’ growth (SALEG) measured as 
percentage change in sales.  Prior studies also show that firms might use accruals earnings 
management and real earnings management (REM) as a substitute. Therefore, this study 
controls for cutting discretionary expenditure
3
. 
                                                          
3
 Our proxy for cutting discretionary expenditure is adopted from the following equation developed by 
Roychowdhury (2006). 
DISEXt/ATt-1 = β0 + β1 1/ATt-1 + β2 Salest/ATt-1 + eit ,     
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Finally, the following model is then used in testing our hypotheses (H3, H3a, and H3b):  
 
ABS_AEE = β0 + β1 FEMEX + β2 MALEEX + β3BSIZE + β4 ACSIZE +   β5 BIND + β6 
OWN + β7 TEN + β8 OUT + β9 BIG4 + β10 SIZE + β11 LEV + β12 OCF + β13 ROA + β14LOSS 
+ β15 MBV + β16 NOA + β17 SALEG + β18REM,                                                       (3) 
 
where FEMEX is the proportion of AC female financial expertise directors, while MALEEX 
is the proportion of AC male financial expertise directors.  
Since we are using panel data of seven years, the residuals might be biased and suffer 
from cross-sectional correlation and time-series correlation. Following Frankel, McVay, & 
Soliman (2011), Kolev, Marquardt & McVay (2008) and Petersen (2009), we estimate least 
squares regressions and allow standard errors to be clustered by firm to control for cross-





4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for our variables. While Panel A 
summarizes the descriptive statistics for the full sample, Panel B summarizes the descriptive 
statistics for two samples; a sample of firms with at least one female financial expert and a 
sample of firms with no female financial expert directors on their audit committees. Panel A 
shows that the average proportion of female financial expert directors is about 5% while the 
proportion of male experts is 44%. The mean of ABS_AEE is 0.09 in the full sample. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
where DISEX is the discretionary expenses defined as the total of selling, general and administrative expenses, 
research and development expenditure (R&D) and advertising. If R&D and advertising expenses data are 
missing while selling, general, and administrative expense data are available, R&D and advertising expenses are 
set to zero. Finally, AT is the total asset at the beginning of year and Sales is the total sales. 
4
 It is acknowledged that other methods can be used to address the panel data problems. However,  Petersen 
(2009) who examined different techniques that have been used in the literature to address panel data problems 
(including fixed effects, generalized least-squares (GLS) estimation of a random effects model, and adjusted 




addition, Panel B shows that of the full sample 1,070 firm-year observations, or 19%, have at 
least one female financial expert director. The mean ABS_AEE is 0.06 for firms with at least 
one female expert director compared with 0.09 for firms with no female experts (see Table 1, 
Panel B). The results show that these two groups are significantly different regarding 
ABS_AEE. Panel B also indicates that there are significant differences between these two 
groups regarding SIZE, LEV, LOSS, MBV, SALEG and REM. It seems that firms with 
strong internal corporate governance – in terms of BSIZE, ACSIZE, IND, TEN, OUT and 
BIG4 – are more likely to appoint female expert directors.   
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation matrix among ABS_AEE, FEMEX, MALEX 
and other independent variables used in the analysis. The association between ABS_AEE and 
both FEMEX and MALEX is negative and significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. However, 
these are preliminary results, and conclusions can only be drawn after controlling for other 
factors that might affect the quality of earnings. In general, there is no potential 
multicollinearity issue in our analysis as presented in Table 2.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Table 3 presents our regression analysis with ABS_AEE as a dependent variable.  In 
Model 1, similar to prior studies (Bédard et al., 2004; Hossain et al., 2011; Labelle, Gargouri, 
& Francoeur, 2010; Srinidhi et al., 2011; Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011; Yang & Krishnan, 2005), 
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we use measures that capture financial experts (EXPERT) and gender or female directors 
(ACFD) on the audit committee, while in Model 2 we focus on our two variables of interest; 
namely, female financial expert (FEMEX) directors and male financial expert (MALEX) 
directors.
5
   
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
  
Consistent with prior studies (Bédard  et al., 2004; Hossain et al., 2011), the estimated 
coefficient on EXPERT is significantly negative at 10% demonstrating that financial expert 
directors mitigate, to some extent, earnings management, which is consistent with our H1. In 
line with Labelle et al. (2010), Srinidhi et al. (2011) and Thiruvadi & Huang (2011), the 
estimated coefficient on ACFD, as presented in Table 3, is also negative and significant at 
10% thereby supporting, to some extent, the proposition that firms with female directors are 
more likely to report less earnings management, confirming H2.  
Interestingly, while Table 3, Model 2 shows that the coefficient on FEMEX is 
negative and significant at 5%, it shows an insignificant negative relationship between 
ABS_AEE and MALEX
6
, suggesting that female financial experts are more able to improve 
earnings management than their male counterparts are. Furthermore, Panel B of Table 3 
shows a significant difference between the coefficients on FEMEX and MALEX, suggesting 
that female financial experts are more able to constrain earnings management than their male 
counterparts are, hence supporting H3 that female financial expertise has a more pronounced 
impact on aggressive accruals manipulation than that of their male counterparts. The 
                                                          
5
 The rest of the analysis will use this measure. 
6
 Albeit insignificant, this negative relationship between ABS_AEE and MALEX provides moderate support to 
our expectation that male experts are better able to decrease earnings management than other directors with no 
financial experts.  
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significance of FEMEX and insignificance of MALEX, respectively, means that hypothesis 
H3a is supported while hypothesis H3b is not supported. 
The previous regression estimations are based on the absolute value of accruals 
estimation errors as a proxy for earnings management. To further examine the impact of   
female and male financial expert directors upon earnings management, this study also 
differentiates between upward and downward earnings management by dividing the sample 
using the sign of AEE.  As reported in Table 4, the coefficient of FEMEX is significantly 
negative at 1% in the first model with positive AEE and at 10% in the second model with 
absolute value of negative AEE, suggesting that female financial experts constrain both 
income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management. However, Table 4 still 
shows an insignificant relationship between MALEX and earnings quality in models with 
positive and negative AEE. In addition, Panel B still shows that female financial expert has a 
significant impact upon positive AEE than their male counterparts.  
Our results suggest that the findings of prior studies which show a significant 
relationship between AC financial expertise on earnings management (e.g., Bédard et al., 
2004; Hossain et al., 2011; Xie et al., 2003; Yang & Krishnan, 2005) may be driven by 
female financial experts. Specifically, we suggest that the data used by prior studies which 
found a significant relationship between AC financial expertise and earnings management 
could have consisted of female financial experts. Similarly, the contradictory results on the 
effectiveness of AC financial expertise reported by existing studies (see Bédard & Gendron, 
2010) could also be explained in terms of the gender of the financial expert on the AC. This 
is on the basis that studies which used data with a female financial expert on the AC were 
likely to report a significant relationship while studies which used data with a male expert 
were likely to report a non-significant relationship.  
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Overall, these results demonstrate that despite the benefit of appointing financial 
expert directors, female financial experts improve the board’s oversight and monitoring 
effectiveness and, therefore, are more likely to challenge CEOs’ aggressive financial 
reporting decisions than their male rivals would. That is, the current study adds to our 
understanding of how the gender-personal characteristics of financial expert members affect 
their monitoring effectiveness. Such an understanding is essential in evaluating the 
desirability of legislation to prioritize the appointment of female financial expert directors. 
 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
Since female directors are more risk-averse, we expect that the above-reported results 
should be more pronounced in firms operating in litigious industries. Therefore, similar to Ho, 
Li, Tam and Zhang et al. (2015), we split the full sample into two groups based on whether 
the firm is confronting high litigation risk. Following Ho et al. (2015), if the firm belongs to 
industries with SIC codes of 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370–
7370, it is classified as facing high litigation risk.  The results of this analysis are presented in 
Table 5. As expected, they show that, in high litigious industries, FEMEX is negative and 
significant at 1%, while MALEX is negative but still insignificant. On the other hand, Table 5 
shows no significant relationship between ABS_AEE and both FEMEX and MALEX in 
firms with lower litigation risk. These results demonstrate that female financial experts are 
more likely to challenge CEOs’ financial reporting decisions and thus decrease earnings 
management, particularly in highly litigious industries. Furthermore, Panel B of Table 5 
shows significant differences between the coefficients on FEMEX and MALEX in litigious 
industries, suggesting that litigation risk motivates female financial expert directors to exert 




[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Overall, the results in Tables 3, 4 and 5 provide considerable evidence to suggest that 
female financial expert directors are associated with less earnings management, implying that 
these directors are more likely to mitigate excessive financial reporting opportunism in their 
firms than their male counterparts are. In addition, this study finds evidence suggesting that 
female financial expert directors decrease the extent of earnings management when their 
companies face high litigation risk. However, there is no similar evidence in firms facing 
lower risk.  
 
5. Robustness analyses 
5.1 Performance-adjusted accruals 
Under the main analysis, we used Accruals Estimation Errors (AEE) estimated based 
on McNichols’ (2002) model as a proxy for earnings management. Extant literature has also 
measured earnings management based on the adjusted-for-performance Jones’ (1991) model. 
We, therefore, adopt a measure of earnings management based on Jones’ model as follows; 
 
WCA i,t /AT i,t-1 = β0 + β1 1/AT i,t-1 + β2  Adj_SALES i,t /AT i,t-1 + β3 ΔOCF i,t /AT i,t-1 + β4 IOCF, i,t + β5 
ΔOCF i,t /AT i,t-1 × IOCFi,t , + εit .                                                                                                                                                                     (4) 
 
where Adj_SALES is change in sales less changes in accounts receivable. ΔOCF refers to the 
changes in cash flows from operations and IOCF, i,t is an indicator variable that equals one if 
ΔOCF is negative, zero otherwise.  While ΔOCF captures current year earnings news, IOCF, 
i,t  and ΔOCF i,t /A i,t-1 × IOCF, i, make equation (1) a piecewise linear model that controls for the 
asymmetric recognition of unrecognized gains and losses (Ball & Shivakumar, 2006; 
Athanasakou, Strong, & Walker,  2011). The discretionary accrual for each firm is then 
22 
 
calculated as the residuals from equation (4) estimated annually for each two-digit SIC 
industry with at least 15 observations. Using this measure of earnings management, un-
tabulated results still show that female financial experts are more associated with high 
earnings quality than their male counterparts are. 
  
5.2 Controlling for endogeneity 
The results reported under the main analysis might be subject to potential self-
selection bias if earnings management and female directors are endogenously determined; in 
this case, any conclusion drawn from our model might be misleading. Therefore, to deal with 
any potential endogeneity problem, we use a two-stage model as developed by Heckman’s 
(1976) procedure. In the first-stage model, we compute the inverse Mills ratio (MILLS) from 
a probit model capturing the determinant of appointing female directors on the audit 
committee.  This probit model controls for return on assets, firm size, sales growth, Tobin’s 
Q, annual stock return, board size, audit committee size, the percentage of independent 
directors, stock ownership, average director tenure and average number of outside 
directorships. In addition, we include the ratio of female-to-male participation in the state 
where the firm is headquartered
7
. We expect that this variable will affect the appointment of 
female directors (Chen et al., 2017) but not our dependent variable.  In the second stage, 
MILLS is then added to Model 3 as an additional control variable for endogeneity issues.  We 
present the results of the second-stage regression in Table 6. It shows that the coefficient of 
female expert directors (FEMEX) is still negative and highly significant while MALEX is 
still negative but insignificant, suggesting that our results reported under the main analysis 
are not subject to self-selection bias.  
                                                          
7
 These data are available on the US Census Bureau website.   
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
5.3 Controlling for female directors 
Extant research suggests that the participation of female directors on the board affects the 
level of earnings management (see for example, Arun et al., 2015; Srinidhi et al., 2011) and 
therefore, as a robustness test, we repeat our main analysis after controlling for the 
participation of female directors (FDir) on the board
8
, where FDir is measured as the 
percentage of independent female directors to total number of directors on the board. The 
results of this analysis are reported in Table 7 which still shows that female financial experts 
are more associated with high earnings quality than their male counterparts are.     
[Insert Table 7 here] 
      
5.4 Change to female financial expert 
If our hypothesis (H3) which states that female financial experts have more pronounced 
impact on earnings management than male financial experts is valid, we would expect to find 
improvement (deterioration) in accruals quality in the year after the appointment of female 
(male) financial expert directors. Consequently, 248 cases changing to female financial 
expert directors are identified as opposed to 638 cases changing to male expert directors. We 
then add two dummy variables (FEMEX and MALEX) that capture these changes to Model 3, 
where FEMEX is set to one when the firm transfers to a female financial expert director and 
zero otherwise, and MALEX is set to one when the firm transfers to a male financial director 
and zero otherwise. Un-tabulated results still show a significant negative relationship between 
FEMEX and discretionary accruals, and a negative but insignificant relationship between 
                                                          
8
 We thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this point. 
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MALEX and discretionary accruals, thereby supporting the main results reported under the 
main analysis.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The paper investigated the influence of AC financial expertise and gender on earnings 
management using data from a sample of US firms from 2007 to 2013. In line with prior 
studies (e.g., Arun et al., 2015; Bédard  et al., 2004;  Gul et al., 2011; Hossain et al., 2011; 
Nekhili et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2003), we showed that financial expertise and gender are 
effective monitoring mechanisms. We then split our sample into female and male financial 
experts to investigate whether the gender of the financial expert matters. The results indicate 
that the proportion of female experts on the AC significantly reduce earnings management. 
However, we found no evidence of a similar effect from the proportion of male experts on the 
audit committee. 
The results of the study contribute to existing literature as they suggest that previous 
results (e.g., Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Badolato et al., 2014; Qi & Tian, 
2012) which indicate that AC financial expertise is an important monitoring mechanism in 
reducing earnings may be driven by AC female experts. The finding that only AC female 
experts constrain earnings management also makes an important contribution to the literature 
in that it offers a possible explanation for the conflicting findings on the effectiveness of 
financial expertise as a monitoring mechanism. Specifically, we suggest that previous studies 
which found that financial expertise is a significant monitoring mechanism may have used 
data consisting of AC female experts while those that reported no significant association 
could have used data with AC male financial experts. Finally, the study also contributes to 
the understanding of the effect of gender on earnings management since there are only a few 
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yet contradictory studies to date (e.g., Ismail & Abdullah, 2013; Sun et al., 2011; Qi & Tan, 
2012).  
Our findings has important policy implications for the composition of the AC as they 
suggests that, when appointing financial experts to the AC, aiming for gender balance may 
reduce its effectiveness. The results imply that the higher the proportion of female financial 
experts on the AC, the more effective the committee is at restraining earnings management. 
On the contrary, the insignificance of the proportion of male financial expertise brings into 
question whether male financial expertise is needed as part of the AC.  
Although we found no evidence that male financial expertise significantly influences 
earnings management, there is moderate evidence from separate analysis of our data (not 
documented) that female financial experts can better decrease earnings management than 
their male non-financial experts. Nonetheless, while we have used two different measures for 
accruals-based earnings management, similar to prior studies, our findings are still subject to 
measurement errors, and therefore we suggest that future studies might investigate whether 
these differences between male and female financial experts exist in other accounting 
contexts (i.e. earnings persistence, timeliness of loss recognition, characteristics of analyst’s 
forecasts, or tax avoidance). In addition, we have followed a broader definition of the 
‘financial expert’ and therefore future research might differentiate between accounting and 
non-accounting experts.  Finally, we acknowledge that our results may not be applicable to 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample 
Variables        MEAN MEDIAN STD DEV Q1 Q3 
ABS_AEE     0.09 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.07 
EXPERT 0.49 0.4 0.32 0.25 0.75 
ACFD 0.12 0 0.16 0 0.25 
FEMEX 0.05 0 0.12 0 0 
MALEX 0.44 0.33 0.31 0.25 0.67 
BSIZE 8.9 9 2.03 7 10 
ACSIZE 3.71 4 0.94 3 4 
IND 0.79 0.8 0.11 0.71 0.88 
OWN 0.02 0.01 0.05 0 0.01 
TEN 9.43 9.08 3.43 7 11.33 
OUT 0.91 0.88 0.51 0.5 1.27 
BIG4 0.93 1 0.26 1 1 
SIZE 7.72 7.54 1.54 6.58 8.73 
LEV 0.49 0.28 0.9 0 0.63 
OCF 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.17 
ROA 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.11 
LOSS 0.14 0 0.35 0 0 
MBV 2.97 2.23 2.75 1.44 3.47 
NOA 0.7 0.53 0.66 0.32 0.86 
SALEG 0.07 0.06 0.2 -0.01 0.15 















Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Comparing Firms with at Least One Female Expert and Firms 
with No Female Expert on the Audit Committee  
Variable Firms with at Least One Female Expert  
(N= 1070)  
 
Firms with No Female Expert   
(N= 4590 
Test of difference between 
means 
Mean Mdn t-statistic P value Mdn S.D. t-statistic P value 
ABS_AEE     0.06 0.03 0.14 0.09 0.03 0.19 3.572 0.0004 
BSIZE 9.78 10 1.89 8.69 9 2.01 -16.0659 0.0000 
ACSIZE 3.96 4 0.96 3.66 3 0.93 -9.4851 0.0000 
IND 0.81 0.83 0.1 0.78 0.8 0.11 -7.5237 0.0000 
OWN 0.02 0 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.0342 0.9727 
TEN 9.14 8.9 3.04 9.5 9.13 3.51 3.1152 0.0018 
OUT 1.03 1 0.49 0.88 0.83 0.52 -8.912 0.0000 
BIG4 0.98 1 0.13 0.91 1 0.28 -8.0251 0.0000 
SIZE 8.33 8.29 1.57 7.58 7.39 1.49 -14.6567 0.0000 
LEV 0.63 0.44 0.95 0.46 0.24 0.88 -5.3471 0.0000 
OCF 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.08 1.5104 0.1310 
ROA 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 -0.5035 0.6147 
LOSS 0.12 0 0.32 0.14 0 0.35 2.0451 0.0409 
MBV 3.12 2.35 2.97 2.93 2.19 2.69 -2.0463 0.0408 
NOA 0.71 0.52 0.68 0.7 0.54 0.65 -0.4501 0.6526 
SALEG 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.08 0.06 0.2 3.0197 0.0025 
REM -0.03 -0.04 0.5 -0.06 -0.05 0.48 -1.7215 0.0852 
Variable Definition: 
ABS_AEE: Absolute value of accruals estimation error as the residual from equation (1).  
FEMEX: Proportion of female financial expert directors to the total number of audit committee members. 
MALEX: Proportion of male expert directors to the total number of audit committee members. 
BSIZE: Board size measured as the total number of directors on the board. 
ACSIZE: Audit committee size measured as the total number of directors on the audit committee. 
IND:  Independent directors measured as the proportion of independent directors to the total number of directors on the board. 
OWN: Non-executive directors’ share of ownership measured as the proportion of the number of shares held by non-executives to 
the total outstanding shares at the year-end. 
TEN: Non-executive directors’ tenure measured as the average number of years during which the non-executive directors were 
active on the board. 
OUT: Non-executive directors’ outside directorships measured as the average number of outside directorships held by non-
executive directors.  
BIG4: Big4 auditor measured as indicator variable set to one if the audit firm is big4, and zero otherwise. 
SIZE: The natural log of firms’ market capitalization value. 
LEV: Leverage measured as the long-term debt scaled by common equity. 
OCF: Cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets.  
ROA: Return on assets measured as net income divided by lagged total assets. 
LOSS: Indicator variable set to one if the firm reports net loss, and zero otherwise.  
MBV: Market-to-book value ratio measured as market capitalization divided by book value of common equity. 
NOA: Lagged net operating assets divided by sales. 
SALEG: Percentage change in sales. 







Table 2  
Correlation Matrix. 
  ABS_AEE EXPERT ACFD FEMEX MALEX BSIZE ACSIZE IND OWN TEN OUT BIG4 SIZE LEV OCF ROA LOSS MBV NOA SALEG REM 
ABS_AEE 1                                         
EXPERT -0.05
*** 1                                       
ACFD -0.03
* 0.02* 1                                     
FEMEX -0.04
*** 0.32*** 0.64*** 1                                   
MALEX -0.03
** 0.93*** -0.23*** -0.05*** 1                                 
BSIZE -0.07
*** 0.10*** 0.26*** 0.17*** 0.04*** 1                               
ACSIZE -0.05
*** -0.11*** 0.17*** 0.04*** -0.13*** 0.43*** 1                             
IND -0.02 0.07
*** 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.18*** 0.26*** 1                           
OWN 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02
* -0.04*** -0.12*** 1                         
TEN -0.02 -0.02 -0.08
*** -0.05*** 0.00 0.01 0.03** -0.21*** 0.10*** 1                       
OUT -0.03
** 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.04*** 0.30*** 0.20 0.27*** -0.09*** -0.19*** 1                     
UDIT -0.02
* 0.08*** 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.23*** 0.11*** 0.16*** -0.05*** -0.07*** 0.18*** 1                   
SIZE 0.02
* 0.10*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.04*** 0.52*** 0.26*** 0.21*** -0.15*** -0.03** 0.39*** 0.25*** 1                 
LEV -0.03
*** 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.03** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.00 -0.05*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 1               
OCF 0.13
*** -0.03** -0.02 -0.02 -0.03** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.02* -0.03*** -0.01 -0.05*** 0.00 0.23*** -0.11*** 1             
ROA 0.09
*** -0.03** 0.01 0.00 -0.04*** 0.02* 0.02 -0.02 -0.05*** 0.05*** -0.02 -0.03** 0.31*** -0.15*** 0.66*** 1           
LOSS -0.03
** 0.02 -0.03* -0.02* 0.03** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.01 0.06*** -0.05*** 0.00 -0.02* -0.28*** 0.09*** -0.35*** -0.67*** 1         
MBV 0.14
*** -0.02 0.07*** 0.02 -0.03** 0.04*** 0.02* 0.08*** -0.03** -0.02* 0.07*** 0.01 0.28*** 0.42*** 0.36*** 0.34*** -0.15*** 1       
NOA -0.07
*** 0.03** -0.05*** 0.00 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.00 -0.04*** 0.00 0.01 0.04*** 0.12*** 0.14*** -0.07*** -0.16*** 0.07*** -0.18*** 1     
SALEG 0.06
*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03** -0.06*** -0.03** -0.03** -0.06*** -0.03* 0.08*** -0.05*** 0.25*** 0.39*** -0.27*** 0.16*** -0.07*** 1   
REM 0.05
*** 0.03** 0.01 0.03* 0.02* 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07*** 0.03** -0.01 0.10*** -0.05***  0.02 1 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 






Association between Female and Male Financial Expert Directors and Accruals Estimation 
Errors.   
Variables        
Model 1 Model 2 
t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic t 
EXPERT -0.014 -1.81
* 
  ACFD -0.026 -1.72
*
 













ACSIZE -0.002 -0.77 -0.003 -0.63 
IND -0.023 -0.98 -0.024 -0.79 
OWN 0.028 0.69 0.029 0.56 
TEN -0.002 -2.19
**
 -0.002 -1.59 
OUT -0.002 -0.41 -0.002 -0.32 
BIG4  -0.001 -0.09 -0.001 -0.11 











ROA -0.062 -1.09 -0.062 -0.89 






















Year Fixed effect YES 
 
YES 
 Adj_R2 0.080649 
 
0.081131 
 F 11.99 
 
8.49 
 OBS 5660 
 
5660 
 Panel B: Testing the significant differences between Male and Female financial Experts 
FEMEX > MALEX                     -0.051 
 
F =    4.33
  
Prob > F =    
0.0376 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively.  









Association between Female and Male Financial Expert Directors and Positive and Negative 
Accruals Estimation Errors. 
 
Variables 
Positive  AEE Negative  AEE 






MALEX -0.002 -0.24 -0.011 -0.88 
BSIZE -0.006 -3
***
 -0.003 -1.23 
ACSIZE 0.001 0.23 -0.004 -0.95 
IND -0.033 -1.04 -0.019 -0.5 
OWN 0.077 1.23 -0.041 -0.66 
TEN -0.002 -1.51 -0.001 -1.25 
OUT 0.003 0.45 -0.006 -0.74 
BIG4  -0.018 -1.25 0.014 0.92 
SIZE 0.002 0.81 -0.002 -0.41 








ROA -0.114 -1.45 0.032 0.36 








 0.000 0.07 











Year Fixed effect YES 
 
YES 
 Adj_R2 0.100271 
 
0.115315 
 F 6.66 
 
6.21 
 OBS 2727 
 
2933 
 Panel B: Testing the significant differences between Male and Female Financial Experts 
FEMEX > MALEX                   -0.057 
 F =    6.19 
Prob > F =    
0.0130   -0.04 
F=    1.95 
Prob > F =    
0.1629  
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively.  












Association between Female and Male Financial Expert Directors and Accruals Estimation 
Errors in High and Low Litigious Industries.  
Variables 
High Litigious Industries Low Litigious Industries 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
FEMEX -0.160 -2.99
***
 0.010 0.48 
MALEX -0.015 -0.69 -0.001 -0.15 
BSIZE -0.008 -1.63 0.001 0.33 
ACSIZE 0.000 0.01 0.001 0.32 
IND -0.030 -0.45 -0.015 -0.69 
OWN 0.041 0.38 -0.040 -1.24 
TEN -0.004 -2.42
**
 0.001 0.7 
OUT 0.009 0.63 -0.002 -0.37 
BIG4  0.003 0.11 -0.006 -0.42 











ROA 0.045 0.32 -0.091 -1.9
*
 
LOSS 0.012 0.51 -0.003 -0.41 
MBV 0.012 3.22
***
 0.003 1.31 
NOA 0.023 0.84 -0.014 -4.13
***
 























 Panel B: Testing the significant differences between Male and Female financial Experts 
FEMEX > MALEX                   -0.145 
 F=    8.08 
Prob > F =    
0.0047   0.011 
F =    0.22 
Prob > F =    
0.6360  
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively.  










Association between Female and Male Financial Expert Directors and Accruals Estimation Error; controlling for endogeneity. 
Variables        
ALL  Positive  AEE Negative  AEE  High Litigious Industries  Low Litigious Industries  





 -0.049 -1.62 -0.159 -2.97
***
 0.015 0.67 
MALEX -0.008 -0.8 -0.003 -0.28 -0.011 -0.86 -0.017 -0.77 -0.001 -0.12 







 0.008 0.86 0.011 0.65 0.015 2.16
**
 
IND 0.018 0.53 0.017 0.44 0.013 0.29 -0.006 -0.08 0.025 0.95 









 -0.001 -0.82 
OUT -0.003 -0.37 0.003 0.38 -0.007 -0.77 0.009 0.6 -0.002 -0.37 
BIG4  0.002 0.11 -0.015 -1.05 0.017 1.08 0.005 0.19 -0.004 -0.26 
SIZE 0.005 1.57 0.007 2.07
**
 0.002 0.53 0.006 0.77 -0.002 -0.62 
LEV -0.013 -2.66
***
















ROA -0.052 -0.76 -0.106 -1.38 0.043 0.48 0.053 0.37 -0.087 -1.79
*
 














 0.001 0.09 0.022 0.81 -0.015 -3.95
***
 














 0.065 1.51 0.051 0.68 0.073 2.56
**
 
Constant -0.097 -0.92 -0.11074 -1 -0.05966 -0.46 0.007428 0.03 -0.11091 -1.23 
Year Fixed 

































MALEX                   -0.048 
F=    3.67 
Prob > F =    
0.0556  -0.052 
F=    4.97 
Prob > F =    
0.0260  -0.038 
F =    1.65 
 Prob > F =    
0.1989 
  -0.142 
F=    7.81 
Prob > F =    
0.0054  0.016 
 F=    0.39 




***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively.  






















Association between Female and Male Financial Expert Directors and Accruals Estimation Error; controlling for female directors. 
Variables        
ALL Positive  AEE Negative  AEE High Litigious Industries Low Litigious Industries 









 -0.006 -0.25 





 -0.004 -1.33 -0.006 -1.39 0.000 -0.04 
ACSIZE -0.003 -0.63 0.001 0.21 -0.004 -0.98 0.001 0.09 0.001 0.34 
IND -0.025 -0.78 -0.027 -0.85 -0.026 -0.63 -0.015 -0.21 -0.027 -1.17 
OWN 0.029 0.56 0.076 1.22 -0.039 -0.63 0.037 0.35 -0.038 -1.17 
TEN -0.002 -1.59 -0.002 -1.55 -0.001 -1.23 -0.005 -2.46
**
 0.001 0.76 
OUT -0.002 -0.32 0.004 0.46 -0.006 -0.74 0.010 0.69 -0.002 -0.36 
FDir 0.006 0.14 -0.041 -0.9 0.042 0.73 -0.124 -1.25 0.075 2.01
**
 
BIG4 -0.002 -0.12 -0.017 -1.17 0.013 0.85 0.005 0.19 -0.008 -0.6 









 -0.003 -0.54 









ROA -0.062 -0.89 -0.114 -1.46 0.032 0.36 0.041 0.29 -0.092 -1.91
*
 














 0.001 0.17 0.020 0.72 -0.013 -4.04
***
 























Year Fixed effect YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Adj_R2 0.080974 
 
0.100267  0.115226  0.160579  0.035198  
F 8.14 
 
6.4  5.97  8.3  3.06  
OBS 5660 
 
2727  2933  1987  3673  
Panel B: Testing the significant differences between Male and Female Financial Experts 




Prob > F 
=    
0.0489  
3.22 
Prob > F 
=    
0.0730  
Prob > F 
=    
0.1125  
Prob > F 
=    
0.0343  
Prob > F 
=    
0.8088 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively.  
All variables’ definitions are given in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
